The TDM Agent has no privileges of its own: it runs as the calling user, sends the LLM only TDM metadata, value lists and counts, and can only write a draft execution that TDM must still authorize and a person must start. This article describes what data reaches the LLM, the security controls, retention and audit, and the split of responsibility between K2view and the customer. It is intended for information-security and architecture reviewers.
For the components and the request flow, see TDM Agent Architecture.
The LLM sees TDM configuration and selection metadata, plus value lists and counts. It never receives source records: the agent has no SQL or free-query tool, and no tool returns entity rows.
LLM provider and data residency. The agent calls the environment's default LLM interface. The customer chooses and configures the provider:
With a private endpoint or a self-hosted model, no data leaves the customer's network. K2view does not host or proxy the LLM traffic. See LLM Connectors.
MCP tools. Results returned to an MCP client go to that client's own model, not to the LLM configured in Fabric. They are the same kinds of lookup results listed in the table above, plus draft and execution results. The customer's policy for that AI client applies.
Reducing exposure further. Value examples come from business-parameter definitions. If parameter values are sensitive (for example, if they hold personal identifiers), mask them in the parameter definition or exclude them from the parameter list.
The agent has no privileges of its own. It runs as the calling user, cannot run queries or Fabric commands, and can only write a draft execution that TDM must still authorize and a person must start.
| Area | Control |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Standard Fabric authentication: SSO/OAuth, JWT, API key, Fabric session or Basic. See Fabric Web Services Security. |
| Authorization | Fabric RBAC on each web service. Chat and REST API web services run without elevated permissions. |
| TDM permissions | Task search applies the user's TDM permission group. Starting an execution goes through TDM's normal role and environment checks. See Permission Groups (User Types) and Environment Permission Sets Tab for more information about the TDM permissions. |
| API identity | Each test case runs with the submitting user's name and Fabric roles. |
| Tool surface | An explicit tool allow-list per agent. Built-in SQL and Fabric-command tools are disabled. Calls to tools outside the list are blocked. |
| Write scope | One draft execution record per prepared case, marked as AI-created and linked to the agent session, only on Active tasks. Internal-only override keys are rejected. |
| Execution | None by the agent. A user starts the run from the review or execution link. |
| Guardrail hooks | A pre-tool hook blocks an incomplete preparation. Post-tool hooks end the run once preparation completes or an edit fails. |
| Run limits | A capped number of LLM iterations per turn, continuations and sub-agent depth. |
| Secrets | LLM credentials live in the Fabric interface, kept in the Fabric secret manager or provided by cloud identity (IAM role, ADC), and never in the agent or the prompt. See Secrets Management. |
| Encryption in transit | HTTPS/TLS between client and Fabric, and between Fabric and the LLM provider |
| Encryption at rest | Inherited from the Fabric storage and TDM database configuration |
Prompt rules (never execute, never reveal override JSON) are a second layer. The hard boundaries are the tool allow-list, the hooks and TDM's own permissions.
MCP access. Fabric exposes each deployed Data Product as an MCP server, and this is enabled by default. MCP clients authenticate with the same Fabric methods as the web services, and Fabric RBAC authorizes them at Data Product and entity-instance level. Permissions cannot be set per tool. Most TDM MCP tools are read-only lookups, and task search returns only tasks in groups the user may see. Two tools act: CreateExecutionDraft saves an execution draft, and StartTaskExecution starts a task execution. A started execution runs with the calling user's identity and passes TDM's permission and execution validations. Because permissions cannot be set per tool, any role with MCP access to the TDM LU can start the executions its TDM permissions allow. See TDM MCP Tools and Data Product MCP.
Every conversation is recorded inside the customer's Fabric deployment and deleted by a scheduled cleanup after a configurable window.
Retention
Cleanup is a built-in job that the customer turns on and schedules as needed.
Audit trail
The trace holds what the agent saw. Access to trace endpoints and the Insights database should be limited to operators.
K2view delivers the agent and its built-in controls. The customer owns the deployment, the identities and the choice of LLM.
test-data-agent/* web services only to tester and pipeline roles. Limit trace and observation endpoints to operators.The TDM Agent has no privileges of its own: it runs as the calling user, sends the LLM only TDM metadata, value lists and counts, and can only write a draft execution that TDM must still authorize and a person must start. This article describes what data reaches the LLM, the security controls, retention and audit, and the split of responsibility between K2view and the customer. It is intended for information-security and architecture reviewers.
For the components and the request flow, see TDM Agent Architecture.
The LLM sees TDM configuration and selection metadata, plus value lists and counts. It never receives source records: the agent has no SQL or free-query tool, and no tool returns entity rows.
LLM provider and data residency. The agent calls the environment's default LLM interface. The customer chooses and configures the provider:
With a private endpoint or a self-hosted model, no data leaves the customer's network. K2view does not host or proxy the LLM traffic. See LLM Connectors.
MCP tools. Results returned to an MCP client go to that client's own model, not to the LLM configured in Fabric. They are the same kinds of lookup results listed in the table above, plus draft and execution results. The customer's policy for that AI client applies.
Reducing exposure further. Value examples come from business-parameter definitions. If parameter values are sensitive (for example, if they hold personal identifiers), mask them in the parameter definition or exclude them from the parameter list.
The agent has no privileges of its own. It runs as the calling user, cannot run queries or Fabric commands, and can only write a draft execution that TDM must still authorize and a person must start.
| Area | Control |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Standard Fabric authentication: SSO/OAuth, JWT, API key, Fabric session or Basic. See Fabric Web Services Security. |
| Authorization | Fabric RBAC on each web service. Chat and REST API web services run without elevated permissions. |
| TDM permissions | Task search applies the user's TDM permission group. Starting an execution goes through TDM's normal role and environment checks. See Permission Groups (User Types) and Environment Permission Sets Tab for more information about the TDM permissions. |
| API identity | Each test case runs with the submitting user's name and Fabric roles. |
| Tool surface | An explicit tool allow-list per agent. Built-in SQL and Fabric-command tools are disabled. Calls to tools outside the list are blocked. |
| Write scope | One draft execution record per prepared case, marked as AI-created and linked to the agent session, only on Active tasks. Internal-only override keys are rejected. |
| Execution | None by the agent. A user starts the run from the review or execution link. |
| Guardrail hooks | A pre-tool hook blocks an incomplete preparation. Post-tool hooks end the run once preparation completes or an edit fails. |
| Run limits | A capped number of LLM iterations per turn, continuations and sub-agent depth. |
| Secrets | LLM credentials live in the Fabric interface, kept in the Fabric secret manager or provided by cloud identity (IAM role, ADC), and never in the agent or the prompt. See Secrets Management. |
| Encryption in transit | HTTPS/TLS between client and Fabric, and between Fabric and the LLM provider |
| Encryption at rest | Inherited from the Fabric storage and TDM database configuration |
Prompt rules (never execute, never reveal override JSON) are a second layer. The hard boundaries are the tool allow-list, the hooks and TDM's own permissions.
MCP access. Fabric exposes each deployed Data Product as an MCP server, and this is enabled by default. MCP clients authenticate with the same Fabric methods as the web services, and Fabric RBAC authorizes them at Data Product and entity-instance level. Permissions cannot be set per tool. Most TDM MCP tools are read-only lookups, and task search returns only tasks in groups the user may see. Two tools act: CreateExecutionDraft saves an execution draft, and StartTaskExecution starts a task execution. A started execution runs with the calling user's identity and passes TDM's permission and execution validations. Because permissions cannot be set per tool, any role with MCP access to the TDM LU can start the executions its TDM permissions allow. See TDM MCP Tools and Data Product MCP.
Every conversation is recorded inside the customer's Fabric deployment and deleted by a scheduled cleanup after a configurable window.
Retention
Cleanup is a built-in job that the customer turns on and schedules as needed.
Audit trail
The trace holds what the agent saw. Access to trace endpoints and the Insights database should be limited to operators.
K2view delivers the agent and its built-in controls. The customer owns the deployment, the identities and the choice of LLM.
test-data-agent/* web services only to tester and pipeline roles. Limit trace and observation endpoints to operators.